After Future climate policy regimes may be based on the Kyoto-Protocol or on other policy instruments such as carbon-taxes. Any effective regime based on the Protocol requires the determination of the concrete contributions by each Party. This involves namely the time of contribution and the quantification of the contribution itself. By now many proposals exist for the two issues, as for example thresholds like GDP per capita for the question of timing or emissions per capita for an allocation of emission rights. Based on the two justice principle responsibility and equity of rights that form the basis for the so-called Brazilian Proposal and Contraction & Convergence respectively, a new approach is developed: Future emission rights are allocated on the basis of equal emissions per capita over time. By so doing not only are emissions per capita (EPC) taken into account during the allocation but also their evolution over time. I show that nations with high EPC may even be allocated negative quantities of emissions right due to their historical "burden". On the other hand, Parties with low EPC would be allocated large amounts of "fair air" which can increase the incentive to accept absolute emission targets. Even though this approach may currently lack political acceptability, it offers another analytical reference point for the political bargaining process on future allocations.
Introduction
Climate is changing (WMO 2003) and there is more and more evidence that this is due to the human release of greenhouse gases (GHG). This is why the international community adopted the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) and its Kyoto Protocol (1997) which sets inter alia the initial step for limiting GHG emissions in the period 2008 to 2012. Even though the Protocol has not entered into force by now, the discussion on future contributions to GHG emission reductions has intensified recently as commitments for subsequent periods shall be initiated at least in 2007 (Art. 3. 9 Kyoto Protocol). The discussion on the allocation of emission entitlements 1 dates back to 1990's and since then many approaches have been and are still presented. Yet, no compromise seems currently reachable as the views between developed and developing countries are rather contrary. 2 On the other hand climate continues to change and thus some action is likely to be agreed upon. Whether it constitutes the deep cut in emissions that is demanded by some stakeholders remains to be seen. The same is true for the Protocol itself: agreements among like-minded countries may also emerge instead of a global consensus (for example Sugiyama (2003)). And the question of sharing the burden of adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change has not even been legitimately addressed in the negotiations, though the discussion at CoP 8 started to look at this issue.
Assuming a future evolution of the Kyoto Protocol, there are two basic options with regard to the determination of future allocations of emission permits. The first option are rolling agreements restricted to the next commitment period, be it five years as the first one or another duration. Secondly, a long-term -if not eternal -approach for allocating emission permits to the Parties of the Convention could be agreed upon (see also Berk et al. (2001) p. 466 ). An unexpected advocate of the later approach could be industry. In the run-up of the emission trading scheme on the entity level in the European Union (EU (2003)), industry has asked for clear perspectives with regard to the allowance allocation (Anonymous (2003) ). Business seeks certainty because of the long life-time of a number of installations as for example coal-fired power plants (see also Aldy et al. (2003) p. 10). Furthermore, by establishing a long-term allocation 1 The terms emission entitlement, emission right, emission permit and emission allowance are used equivalently in this paper. Note that the term permit is used differently in the EU-directive on emissions trading (EU 2003) .
2 Carraro (1998) shows that an agreement signed by all countries seems quite unlikely from a game theoretic point of view. On the other hand, Ciscar et al. (2002) show for a sequential game framework that both Annex-I as well as non-Annex-I countries reduce their emissions after 2010 as they face climate change.
scheme, there would be no incentive to re-negotiate the target of an upcoming commitment period. This could be of interest in case a Party fears non-compliance in an earlier period (Barret (2002) p. 4, similar Aldy et al. (2003) p. 8).
However, the earlier the targets are set for long-term GHG emissions, the more difficult the negotiations on international level are. Currently, the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility", as set in the UNFCCC; is widely accepted but in the longrun developing countries will also be asked to contribute to limiting global GHG emissions. And while trying to determine a Party's contribution each is likely to call for a "fair" allocation. Unfortunately, there is no "one and only" viable justice principle.
Against this background, this paper offers a new approach for the determination of a long-term future allocation. It is based on the so-called Brazilian Proposal (UNFCCC (1997) and the Contraction & Convergence approach (Meyer 2000) . Thus, it combines the two justice principles responsibility and equity of rights. Throughout the paper I assume that the future climate policy regime is based on two principles underlying the Kyoto Protocol. This is namely the quantification of absolute emission budgets for each Party as well as emission trading. I concentrate on the participation method and the determination on the emission targets only. Neither the allocation of burdens from adaptation to climate change nor the distribution of benefits from mitigation are considered.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section summarises the key points of the current international climate policy regime. Section three discusses the key issues for allocation of emission permits in the future climate policy regime assuming that it is based on the Kyoto-principles. In section four, a general version of a new approach for the determination of time of participation as well as the quantification of contributions for further Parties is presented, followed by a numerical example in the subsequent chapter. Section six concludes.
Key points of the current regime
In this section core points of the existing international climate policy regime which are relevant in the context of the paper are summarised.
The basic documents of the international regime are as follows: the Framework Convention, the Kyoto-Protocol, the Bonn Agreement and the Marrakech Accords.
Depending on the issue under discussion others must be considered as well, as for the example the decisions of the executive board for the CDM or upcoming papers for the treatment of LULUCF projects. (Babiker et al. 2002, p. 411) for the determination of the emission targets. They are rather the outcome of a political bargaining process with limited time (Torvanger et al. 1999 p. 13, Grubb et al. 1999 4 .
In order to allow a cost-efficient meeting of the absolute emission targets, four flexible mechanisms have been introduced with international emissons trading (IET), joint implementation (JI), and the clean development mechanism (CDM), being the most important options (for more details see for example Grubb et al. 1999 , Michaelowa 2001 . At this point it is only important to recall that the use of IET and JI between Annex I countries does not affect the total allowed emissions of Annex B countries. The generation of so-called Certified Emission Reductions from CDM-projects in developing countries on the other hand increase the total budget of emission permits as they are not deducted from any national budget as in the case of IET or JI. This is why special rules for the determination of the reference scenarios, for monitoring, validation and certification for the CDM are necessary.
Preparation to and bearing of costs of adaptation to the adverse affects of climate change is also vaguely dealt with in the different documents. As the paper focuses on mitigation efforts only, adaptation is not discussed any further.
Key issues for mitigation efforts in the future climate policy regime
There has been a large discussion on the Kyoto-Protocol itself, its future development as well as on possible alternatives. The probably most famous comment on the Protocol was the withdrawal by the Bush administration. It was judged that the implementation of the Protocol would be too costly to the US economy and that it was lopsided for not imposing obligations on the developing countries. Unfortunately, the US administration did not manage to present an alternative until now -even though it seems to be the only option remaining for the US (Bodansky (2002)). However, this has been done by others, even prior to the US withdrawal. Most importantly emission trading itself has been criticised. Instead, taxes have been favoured (Pizer (1997) , Cooper (2000)).
Others do not propose to directly reject Kyoto but, for example, to put the stress on long term issues. For example, Barrett (2002) proposes to focus on collective funding of basic research into development of new, carbon-saving technologies. However, even though the possibility for short term protocols, such as the Kyoto Protocol, is briefly discussed, no reference to the ultimate objective of the framework convention is madean aspect that should be generally taken into account when discussing future climate policy regimes. Edmonds et. al (1999) provide an analyses of a more specified "technology protocol". Baumert et al. (1999) propose intensity targets as incentives for voluntary participation of developing countries. But they also point out that this would require a re-conceptualisation of the existing framework, in particular with long-term environmental considerations. An overview and evaluation on 13 alternatives to the Kyoto-Protocol is provided by Aldy et al. (2003) . Table 1 ).
Apart from the ultimate emission target there has been an intensive discussion on the interim targets, i.e. the path to take to get there. The most important argument in this discussion has not been the technical feasibility for near term cuts in emissions, but rather the associated costs. Some authors argued that postponing emission reductions would result in lower costs as otherwise existing capital stock would have to be prematurely retired (Wigley et al. (1996) ). Others have argued that by postponing 5 The latter may well be considered as an integral part of any future regime regardless of how it is design in detail (SEPA 2002 p. 38) . The recent activity in Europe with regard to emissions trading on entity level may support this assessment. 6 It should be noted that the stabilisation target does not inevitably require all countries to limit their emissions. Technically it would be conceivable that some countries continue to emit while others invest in removal from the atmosphere including biological sinks and technical removal as suggested by Lackner et al. (no year). reductions the benefits from learning-by-doing would be foregone (Vuuren et al. 2001 ).
Other points of discussion have been the way to consider technical change in economic models or the discount rate to be used (SEPA (2002, pp. 22-25) Once the total target(s) have been set, a discussion on the contribution of the different Parties in order to reach the goal is necessary. 7 As this burden sharing is a zero sum game, it is all but trivial and Parties are likely to put "good" arguments forward in order to get a sufficiently big piece of the pie. 
Excursus: "Good Arguments" or justice priciples
The discussion on justice in the context of climate change started at least at the end of the eighties or early in the nineties of the last century (d'Arge (1989), Rose (1990)).
Since then, different sets of relevant principles have been presented and applied, some of them being quite similar, though called by different names. Table 2 gives some examples for principles discussed. The reader is referred to the authors for more details.
7 A theoretically straightforward way to avoid such discussion implying high transaction costs would be to auction the permits already on the international level. Rose et al. (1998) point out that it is important to distinguish whether a "criterion applies to the process by which a criterion is chosen, the initial allocation of permits, or to be the final outcome of the implementation of the policy instrument..." b) Apart from the three fairness principles, six operational requirements are applied.
Even though we have a more or less clear understanding of these different principles, two major problems are faced when applying them for allocations of emission entitlements 8 : Firstly, the different principles are in most cases equally justified. This is to say that one cannot say which principle is to be preferred in case there are different opinions. To overcome this problem, Müller (2001) proposes the so-called preference score method to reach a "compromise-solution" between different principles or approaches, as discussed below. Secondly, apart from the principle, a reference base, e.g. population, as well as an operational rule for applying the principle, e.g. allocate in
proportion to population, is required (Rose 1992). However, "there is no one-to-one relation between a fairness principle and a specific formula, meaning that one formula can be supported by more than one principle, and one principle can support more than one formula" (Torvanger et al. (1999 p. 15) ). The reference to justice principles may thus guide negotiations, but it is unlikely that any agreement reached will fit into a clear systematic concept. Finally, Rose et al. (1998) showed that a mere philosophical distinction between different criteria may well be mathematically equivalent and thus have the same welfare outcomes.
"Formula" and "reference bases" for applying equity principles
When referring to justice principles in the context of the allocation of emission rights in the future climate policy regime, they have to be specified in way that allows calculation of an emission target. Theoretically, the number of potential reference bases seems unlimited. Rose (1992 p. 65) proposes the following reference bases: § Economic welfare § Population § Land area § Energy use § Energy reserves § CO 2 emissions
Other bases, as for example GHG emissions, GHG abatement costs could also qualify.
For making them an operational reference, other "units" as for example CO 2 emissions per capita or per unit GDP would sometimes be necessary. Referring to the initial part of this section, these reference bases could mostly be used for both the determination of thresholds for participation as well as for the determination of the contribution to mitigation efforts. 9 It goes without saying that the figures can be weighed and combined.
Proposals for allocations of permits
The first proposals and analyses for allocation of permits date back to the beginning of the 1990's (for example Barret 1992). Subsequently, a larger number of proposals emerged as a result of the Ad Hoc Group of the Berlin Mandate (AGBM). These proposals differ with regard to their specification as well as to the reference basis chosen (Torvanger et al. (1999) ). An overview is given in Table 3 . Number of times applied 3 9 7 7 5 *) 2 *) 2 2 1 4 CDE = (Level of) CO2 -eq emissions, Cap. = Capita, GDP = Gross domestic Product, Cum = cumulative historical, CDE exp / CDE tot = share of emissions resulting from production of goods for export relative to total emissions, dPop/ dt = Population growth, EXP/FF = Fossil fuel intensity of export, CDE / km 2 = emissions per square kilometer of a country's territorial basis Apart from the specification, the proposals differ with respect to the degree of differentiation. Based on the experience from the European burden-sharing negotiations, Ringius (1997, p. 5) argues for differentiated agreements, as "the symmetrical approach ... might result in inefficient and unfair agreements and country obligation." On the other hand, Torvanger et al. (1999, p. 28) questions whether the EU case can be transferred to greater number of countries. Furthermore, it may be difficult to define the indicator for differentiation on a global level, especially if differences among countries to be considered are based on differences in preferences. To demonstrate this point, consider Germany that has a problem with nuclear energy and rather prefers electricity from lignite-fired power-plants. Why should other Parties renounce a certain part of "their" allocation only because of this particular German preference? A symmetrical approach may thus be supported by a greater number of countries. § The Brazilian proposal The Brazilian proposal (UNFCCC 1997) has been prepared for the 7 th session of the AGBM. The core element is the allocation of emission permits in proportion to the historical responsibility for global warming in terms of accumulated contribution to radiative forcing or temperature increase of certain Parties. 10 Indeed, an allocation of permits was only suggested for Annex-I countries and an overall budget of 30 % below 1990 emissions by 2020 was proposed. CO 2 emissions from the energy sector and cement production should be considered. Non-Annex-I countries were not to make any binding commitment with regard to emission limitations.
The initial Brazilian proposal has been criticised for several reasons, as for example the restriction to CO 2 emissions from limited sources or the methodology used for calculating the contributions to global warming. The proposal had been revised but still some drawbacks remained. Nevertheless, a group of experts came to the conclusion that "... these deficiencies can in general be readily addressed by improving the model by corrections or by importing techniques and processes already available in other models." (den Elzen et al. (1999) . Even though the discussion among experts continued (for an overview see: IIDS (2003)) no final applicable methodology has been found yet.
Most important issues are the indicators for climate change, the consideration of nonlinearities and feedbacks, as well as the databases. However, they conclude that "... the Brazilian Proposal is probably the best one to deal with the "common but differentiated responsibilities ..."" (IISD 2000).
• 
Equal Emissions per Capita over Time (EECT)
In the previous section several options for quantifying the Parties' contributions to the reduction of global GHG emissions have been discussed. As mentioned some multicriteria approaches have also been proposed so far. In this section I present a new approach for the development of the future climate policy regime by combining the equal per capita allocation with the historical responsibility approach.
One may generally question whether an allocation based on equal per capita emissions or on historical responsibility is "equitable" (e.g. Beckerman et al. 1995) . However, I
neglect this theoretical discussion and rather analyse the implications of such an allocation based on these two principles as practical politics may well decide on such a rule regardless of its support by any justice principle. And as mentioned above, the two approaches have been judged to be a good candidate for forming the basis of future burden sharing schemes.
Even though it has not been explicitly said, the path for reaching an allocation based on equal per capita emissions so far has generally been understood as an monotonously decreasing curve from the day a Party participates (t 1 in Fig 1) until equal per capita emissions are reached (t 3 in Fig 1) countries." Shukla (1999) argues the same way and suggests a more equitable convergence scheme as depicted in Figure 2 . However, the scheme is not further specified.
I build on this idea and propose to allocate emission rights based on a path such that average emissions per capita are also equal for a certain period prior to t 3 . Denoting the beginning of this period by t 1 , this means that the sum of the emissions per capita in the period between t 1 and t 3 has to be equal for all nations.
Mathematically, this means that the integral in the limits of t 1 and t 3 of a (piecewisesee below) continuous function ) (t i Φ which describes the allowed emissions per capita at the time t in country i has to be equal for all nations. Mathematically,
This condition does not inevitably imply that all Parties are allocated a certain assigned amount from the point t 1 . This may happen at a later point t i * with t 1 < t i * < t 3 and would allow for some flexibility with regard to the timing of participation. This is important, as not every Party would even be technically able to take on an absolute emission budget promptly. (This would be the consequence if all countries were to start at the same time, as most Annex B countries are likely to have absolute targets with the Kyoto-Protocol entering into force soon.) Other authors have argued for example for an initial voluntary GHG intensity target to take this aspect into account (Baumert et al. 1999 ). However, the emissions released between t 1 and t i* would have an impact on the allocation between t i* and t 3 as the condition in (1) has to be satisfied. Incentives for early participation are discussed after the presentation of the numerical example.
Keeping in mind that current emissions per capita differ strongly between nations, it becomes obvious that nations with low EPC would receive higher allocations than average emissions in future years (see Figure 2) . The opposite would hold true for nations with higher EPC -regardless of whether or not they have an absolute target in the first commitment period. It is important to note, that only the allocation of the permits is based on the curves as shown in Figure 2 . As these permits are traded there would be no need for abrupt cuts in emissions.
Figure 2: Schematic depiction of the path for equal emission per capita over time
To determine the concrete allocation in the future for a single nation, it would thus be necessary:
1. to determine the allowed "sum" in the period between t 1 and t 3 for the Parties 2. to gather historical emission data, if t 1 lies in the past 3. to determine the time of participation for nation i (i.e. In this context it is worthwhile to note, that by the allocation of emission entitlements, emission reductions obligations are only allocated implicitly. The reduction obligation is calculated by the subtraction of the entitlements from the real emissions. However, the future development of the latter is highly uncertain, especially when considering long time horizons as in this paper. Thus, the resulting long-term reduction obligations are uncertain, too.
In the next section a concrete option for the determination of the four steps is presented.
Numerical example
During the discussion of the concrete option in this chapter one should remember that many other options are equally conceivable when specifying the approach. The numerical example is based on CO 2 emission from energy combustion as this data was the most accessible. It goes without saying that the approach can be applied with the whole basket of GHG specified in the Kyoto Protocol.
Determination of the allowed average emissions per capita
The average emissions per capita are determined as follows: A piecewise continuous curve is constructed consisting of a) the world average emissions per capita in the interval from t 1 to t 2 (where t 1 = 1992, the year the Framework Convention on Climate Change has been adopted and t 2 = 2013 the beginning of the second commitment period) b) a straight line connecting world average emissions in t 2 and equal per capita emissions in t 3 (where t 3 = 2092, 100 years after the Framework Convention was adopted). For the determination of the equal per capita emission in 2092 see Annex
1.
A (see equation (1)) is set equal to the area under this curve (see hatched area in Figure   3 ). For determining the actual allowed emissions, one has to multiply the allowed per capita emissions with the corresponding population of the year analysed. 
Determination of time of participation
As mentioned above no specific time for participation is set -except for those Annex B countries having ratified the Protocol. This allows for some flexibility. The only rule assumed is that once a country takes on an absolute allocation of permits, it cannot leave the system anymore. As we discuss later, incentives for early participation depend on the level of current emissions per capita, the treatment of CDM, expectations on future permit prices, etc.
Determination of a function for future allocation
As emissions per capita generally differ among countries, a function for each single Party is needed. I propose to use the same quadratic function of the form It goes without saying the individual allocation can strongly differ from the highly aggregated schedule presented in Figure 5 . Table 4 provides less aggregated data for some countries for the allocation in the next commitment periods. Remember that the figures given dependent on the simplified prognoses for population and emissions.
Furthermore, one has to note that for non-Annex-I countries the starting point of participation is of crucial importance with regard to a country's allocation at a certain time. Figure 6 and 7 visualise this aspect for two countries: Qatar representing countries with currently above average emissions per capita and India for below average countries. As we can see in the case of Qatar, postponing the start of contributing to the global mitigation efforts allows for an business-as-usual, and therefore increasing emissions path. However, the increasing emissions are taken into account later and result in a (more) negative allocation in the last third of the century. The situation for India is similar. Due to its very low emissions per capita, it will be allocated many permits after taking on an absolute emission budget. The later the participation, the 12 World total emissions indeed slightly differ depending on whether or not the US participates early. This decision influences average per capita emission in 2013, that form the starting point for the reduction path until 2092. Cumulative emission from 1992 to 2100 are about 1,700 b t CO 2 . bigger the allocation at the end of the century. Incentives for a certain decision with regard to the participation are discussed in the next chapter. 
Discussion
The numerical example presented above revealed two important implications of the approach presented in the previous section. Firstly, an allocation based on equal per capita emissions considering the historical load can result in a negative allocation in some future commitment periods for countries with emission per capita above averageregardless of whether or not they are already Annex-I countries. The negative allocation on its own, however, is no reason to reject this proposal for theoretical reasons. Indeed, a negative allocation conflicts with the need principle (CICERO p. 20), but on the other hand it takes into account the historical burden concept. Nevertheless, the approach may be politically unattractive right now. A political economy analysis, taking into account the negotiation power of the countries with higher and lower emission per capita respectively, would be an interesting next step. Regardless, the approach provides another analytical input for the political discussion.
The potential financial transfer implied could also be considered as "fair air", given the historical burden of the Annex-I countries, and the need for the eradication of poverty is mentioned several times in the Convention. 13 On the other hand one has to keep in mind that there are also many non-Annex-I countries with per capita emissions above average. They would not benefit from such fair air.
However, regarding the costs implications of the allocation scheme presented, one must remember that the long-term reduction obligation resulting from the allocation of CO 2 entitlements is highly uncertain, as it depends on the future business as usual emission path. The same uncertainty is faced with regard to the abatement costs, especially when considering a time frame of about one hundred years as proposed in this paper. This is why I refrained from presenting any quantitative data on this issue.
Secondly, the incentives for non-Annex-I countries to join early depend on several factors. First of all, one has to remember that the overall allocation of permits is dependent on the population. This can provide certain incentives. For example, a country with higher than average emissions per capita and decreasing population may opt for a late entry when calculating the overall allocation: The low or even negative computed emissions per capita after entry would be multiplied by a small number of people. The opposite is true for Parties with lower than average emissions per capita and decreasing population. They could enter early in order to get a larger allocation in the first half of the century. Whether the aforementioned fact could give rise to a change in population policy is discussible, even though I do not think it is likely: An increase of population growth would only be reasonable for countries with per capita emissions lower than the calculated value for the allocation. The number of these countries is likely to reduce over time, especially with allowable per capita emissions decreasing.
When per capita emissions are higher than the calculated allocation value, a reduction of population would be reasonable, however not realistic from the author's point of view.
Other models also considered population growth as an exogeneously driven factor (Byrne et al. (1998, p. 339) ).
Apart from changes in population other factors would also play an important role for the decision to join. As mentioned above, not all non-Annex I countries may even be technically capable to take on an absolute emission budget due to a lack of human capacity. So far national communications have been submitted much later than envisioned in the 1990's.
A country's market position with regard to both surplus permits and marginal abatement costs would also be important in this context. Furthermore, a country's expectation on technical change and thus future carbon prices is also to be considered.
14 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the approach offers no long-term incentive for carbon leakage. It has been argued in the past that industry may move from countries with emission targets, and thus resulting stronger environmental regulations, to noncapped countries in which GHG emission would be free of charge. In the short run this would still be possible. But the higher early emissions in the un-capped country would be taken into account and result in reduced allocations in the subsequent periods. Thus, the overall emissions over time would be unaffected.
The role of CDM in the future climate policy regime
The CDM is the product of a political discussion that resulted in a second-best solution.
Generally, absolute emission targets for all countries would have been desirable. As the developing countries were vehemently against stringent emissions budgets, the CDM was introduced to involve them all the same. And indeed, the CDM offers the opportunity to realise low cost emission reductions in non-Annex-I countries.
Even though some approaches for future distribution of emission permits are quite far developed, the authors generally do not explicitly discuss the role of the CDM in their scenarios.
In the approach presented above the CDM would increase the overall emissions. This is due to the fact that the countries' overall assigned amount is independent of the emissions in a certain period (see equation (1)). If a Party, which has not accepted an absolute emission budget yet, hosts a CDM project, its emissions are reduced compared to the non-CDM case. Thus, its emission budget after entry into the scheme would increase. This alone would postpone emissions to a later time and would even be desirable. However, this affect would be compensated as the issuance of CERs allows the buying country to increase its current emissions. Against this background, a continuation of the CDM under the scheme presented above is not reasonable for environmental reasons.
Apart from that, the CDM has other conceptual drawbacks. First of all, it provides incentives for governments in developing countries to refrain from stringent environmental legislation, as only additional projects are eligible for the CDM. 15 With an increasing number of existing projects, the number of opponents to changes in legislation actually increases as projects would get less CERs after a baseline revision due to the higher standard. The number of opponents to any phase out of the CDM is also likely to increase the longer it exists, as project developers, validaters and certifiers, who have all invested in human capital to satisfy the requirements, would oppose it.
Whether the CDM is cost-efficient can also be disputed especially due to the additional transaction costs for the baseline determination, monitoring and certification (for a discussion see Fichtner et al. (2003) ). Apart from that, millions of Euro are currently and will be spent for capacity building programmes in developing countries to make people able to develop project design documents and to set-up designated national authorities. Finally, Bode et al. (2003) also showed how a strict investment additionality test, which is required to prevent illegitimate reduction permits from entering the scheme -can result in inefficient investments. Recent decisions by the CDM-Executive
Board suggest a rather strong additionality test.
Nevertheless, participating countries could still implement JI projects to benefit from low cost reduction options instead of only selling surplus allowances. As for the participation in the CDM, this decision would be up to individual Parties of course. 15 In this context the term legal additionality is often used to be more specific.
Conclusions
A first step to limiting human greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere has been taken by adopting the Kyoto-Protocol in 1997. However, as emission targets have only been agreed upon for a limited number of countries for the so-called first commitment period from 2008 to 2012, some challenging tasks are waiting for the climate negotiators when discussing future contributions to further limit GHG emissions.
A major source of conflict is the different notion of what an equitable contribution is.
Literature provides many justice principles. However, none of these principles is per se more just than the others. Some kind of compromise will have to be found. And apart from these theoretical considerations, it is not easy to institutionalise principles with regard to the allocation of emission rights either. Nevertheless, a number of proposals have now been suggested. They differ with regard to their specification and to the justice principles they refer to. Thus, they are supported differently by developing and industrialised countries as the burden implied changes considerably.
In this framework, a new proposal for the long-term allocation of emissions rights based on the so-called Brazilian Proposal and the Contraction & Convergence approach was presented. It is thus based on the two principles responsibility and equity of rights. The main feature of the proposal is that the average emission per capita in a period to be defined has to be the same for all countries. By determining this allowable average value, the question of the exact starting point of contributing to limitation of global GHG emissions becomes less important. With an overall fixed budget set, higher emissions in the near future result in a smaller allocation of emission permits after a Party decides to join the scheme. This allows for a lot of flexibility for the countries that do not want to accept an emission target right now, be it because they are technically unable to do so or for other reasons. Flexibility in timing can also be one aspect of "differentiated responsibility" (Matsui (2002)).
As the overall allocation is calculated on the basis of a per capita value, the total population is a dominating factor in this calculation. Whether this gives incentives to change population policy is discussible. A numerical example that considered emission since 1992 showed that the allocation may well be negative in some periods for certain countries. In this context, one should note that for the latter issue it is not important whether it is a developing or industrialised country, but rather whether it has considerably higher per capita emissions than average.
The numerical example was restricted on CO 2 emissions from energy combustion. The number of sources could be extended. Future work could also analyse the resulting costs which have not been studied for certain reasons so far. The same goes for the impact on atmospheric GHG concentrations. All errors are mine.
Annexes Annex 1:
Data used for the numerical example.
Population:
Population data and prognoses until 2050 on country level have been taken from UN (2002) . For the prognoses, the medium variant was used.
Further projections are only given for the year 2150 on continental level ( UN (1999) ). The continental trend between the period 2050 and 2150 has been used on the country level as well. For the time in between, a regression curve of the type f(x)=ax 6 +bx 5 +cx 4 +dx 3 +ex 2 +fx+g has been used. Population was assumed to be constant from 2150 onwards. Figure A 1 shows the population development for selected regions. For the future development of GHG emissions, a great number of scenarios is available (see IPCC (2000) that provide a wide range of potential GHG emissions in 2100. In this report, it is stated that "no judgement is offered in this report as to the preference for any of the scenarios and they are not assigned probabilities of occurrence...". This is why a rather straightforward approach has been used to calculate future emission on country level for the numerical example. Historical emissions for the years 1992 to 1998 have been taken. Emissions have been restricted to CO 2 emissions from energy combustion. Data was taken from OECD/IEA (2000). After 1998 emission were assumed to grow annually by 1%. Note that emissions in the numerical example are only shown as long as a Party has not accepted an absolute emission target. Once it participates, the assigned amount is presented. The difference between emissions and assigned amount is not analysed further.
The global budget for CO 2 from energy combustion in 2092 has been set somewhat arbitrarily to 3000 Mio. t CO 2 .
Annex 2:
Three equations are available for the determination of the allocation function ) (t (A2) describes the equal emissions per capita to be reached in t 3 . The same value applies for all countries.
(A3) are the emissions per capita for Party i when it starts to join the system. Berk, Marcel; Schaeffer, Michiel et al. (1999) The Brazilian Proposal and other Options for International Burden Sharing: an evaluation of methodological and policy aspects using the FAIR model, National Graehl, S.; Rentz, O. (2003) The impact of private investors' transaction costs on the the cost effectiveness of project-based Kyoto mechanisms forthcoming, in: Climate Policy GCI (2003) Detailed Ideas behind Contraction and Convergence, Global Common Insitute, http://www.gci.org.uk/, accessed: August 2003 Groenenberg, Heleen; Phylipsen, Dian; Blok, Kornelis (2001) Differentiating commitments world wide: global differentiation of GHG emissions reductions based on the Triptych approach -a preliminary assessment, in: Energy Policy, Vol. 29, pp. 1007 -1030 Vrolijk, Christian; Brack, Duncan (1999) The Kyoto Protocol -A Guide and Assessment, London IISD (2003) The 
